David Xia wandered into SIPA last night for a Saltzman Institute event on the fate of the American war in Afghanistan.
The United States’ war in Afghanistan is not working, and we’re not sure how to fix it.
This was the gist of Col. David Gray and Col. Gian Gentile’s (both of whom have served in Iraq and Afghanistan) talk last night at SIPA.
“We don’t have strategy,” Gentile said. “Instead we have commander’s talking points, maxims, and catechisms.” The prospects of counter-insurgency and nation building have “seduced” army officials to the extent that they lost sight of a bigger strategy.
According to Gray, the army initially wanted to leave a “light footprint” – utilizing strategic raids, advanced technology, special operations forces, intelligence agencies, and native human resources – to avoid attracting Al Qaeda fighters into a chaotic vacuum. And it worked just fine. For two years.
Gray painted a gloomy picture of the many challenges the army faced in creating a viable strategy. These included fighting government corruption, countering the rampant drug trade, and reeling in intractable drug lords, and dealing with the Pashtunwali tribal code to which 70 percent of Afghans subscribe: “In the morning they’ll offer you green tea and a goat grab…at night they’ll be shooting at you.” Moreover, tribal interests do not always align with the Afghan government’s interests. “Some guy from Mazari Sharif in the north isn’t crazy about going down to Kandahar in the south to fight,” he said.
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